The Islamic State in Somalia, an affiliate of ISIS, emerged in 2015 amidst the influence of al-Shabaab. Sheikh Abdulqader Muumin leads the group, exploiting local clan networks for resources. Although recent military actions have diminished its strength, the group remains capable of extorting local businesses and recruiting individuals, underscoring ongoing threats to regional stability.
The Islamic State in Somalia, an affiliate of the broader transnational group Islamic State (ISIS), has its base in Puntland, northern Somalia. This region was the site of the first foreign military action approved by the Trump administration in February 2025 and has been previously linked to plots targeting the Vatican and the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. Researcher Stig Jarle Hansen provides a detailed analysis of its origins, rise, and recent setbacks in Puntland.
The Islamic State in Somalia emerged in 2015 amidst the dominance of the local jihadist group, al-Shabaab, which had been active in the region for years. Sheikh Abdulqader Muumin, a key figure who previously belonged to a splinter group of al-Shabaab, utilized his ties to the Ali Suleiban sub-clan to navigate local smuggling and piracy networks. Puntland’s historical autonomy and strategic smuggling corridors have facilitated the operations of extremist groups.
Muumin, after living in Sweden and the UK, joined al-Shabaab, where he became a significant presence in promoting jihadist ideologies through video content. In 2015, he defected to lead the Islamic State in Somalia, supported by fellow clansman Mahad Moalim. The group’s notoriety surged after a devastating suicide bombing at Bosaso’s Juba Hotel in 2017, forcing the local businesses to submit to extortion hence generating substantial income for the group.
On July 27, 2018, the Islamic State in Somalia was officially recognized as a province, significantly expanding its operational mandate within the ISIS structure. Financial flow from extortion, alongside international funding, allowed the group to assert its influence economically in East Africa, with claims of generating $2.3 million in 2022.
Despite its portrayal as a formidable entity, the Islamic State’s actual territorial control has been minimal, with approximately 600 to 1,600 members in 2024, significantly less than al-Shabaab. Alleged ties to planned attacks, such as those targeting the Israeli embassy and the Vatican, have been disputed, suggesting overestimations of its operational capacity and leadership significance.
In response to the threat posed by the Islamic State, Puntland’s authorities launched effective counter-offensives in early 2025, resulting in considerable casualties among ISIS ranks. However, the group has not been entirely vanquished. With remaining fighters and continued capacity to gather resources, including from local business sectors and potential recruitment from displaced populations, the Islamic State in Somalia still poses a threat to regional stability. Hansen disclaims any affiliations that could influence the findings of his research, maintaining his objectivity in discussing these matters.
In conclusion, the Islamic State in Somalia, despite facing significant military setbacks and a diminished operational footprint, has demonstrated resilience and the capacity to continue its activities through extortion and recruitment. The complexities of regional clan dynamics and Puntland’s historical autonomy have allowed the group to navigate its challenges effectively. As authorities increase counter-terrorism efforts, the threat of the Islamic State persists, warranting continuous attention from both local and international stakeholders.
Original Source: www.inkl.com
