This article series examines the Sri Lankan civil war, detailing the factors leading to the ethnic conflict and the multifaceted military responses against the LTTE. It chronicles the wars across the decades, particularly emphasizing the strategic military victory in 2009, while contrasting it with other global insurgencies to distill pertinent lessons for future conflicts.
This series delves into the complexities of Sri Lanka’s civil conflict and its strategic military operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The escalation of ethnic tensions commenced with pivotal events such as the enactment of the Sinhala-Only Act in 1956, the 1972 Republican Constitution, the electoral results of 1977, and the catastrophic ethnic riots in July 1983 known as the “Black July”. The assassination of thirteen Sri Lankan Army soldiers by the LTTE on July 23, 1983, signified the ignition of armed conflict, heralding the start of Eelam War I, which came to an end in 1987. In the wake of this, the Indian Peacekeeping Forces were deployed between October 1987 and March 1990, resulting in a failed intervention. This was followed by Eelam War II, which lasted until a ceasefire in January 1995. Eelam War III commenced in April 1995 and was marked by a ceasefire in February 2002, noted as the longest cessation of hostilities in this series of conflicts. However, the fragile ceasefire was officially dissolved by the Sri Lankan Government in January 2008, leading to renewed hostilities from 2006 to 2008. The widespread and intense Eelam War IV was initiated in July 2006, culminating in a decisive military victory on May 18, 2009, when the LTTE was cornered near their stronghold in Mullaithivu. While prior governmental strategies were focused on negotiation, the last administration recognized the persistent refusal of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran to consider any form of compromise, instead escalating military responses. Lessons are drawn from the conflict regarding the significance of maritime capabilities, as well as the positive implications of military strategy, which may inform future counterinsurgency efforts globally. The victory over the LTTE, highlighted by Strategic analyses, marks a unique precedent in defeating insurgencies, as stated by Professor Paul Moorcraft, who points out the unusual nature of this victory compared to historical contexts, such as Northern Ireland, where prolonged negotiations were the norm. The comparative analysis extends to other insurgency contexts, such as the conflict with Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Huk insurgency in the Philippines, demonstrating varying degrees of success and the complex dynamics inherent in counterinsurgency operations. In summary, the strategic defeat of the LTTE has not only brought about a state of relative peace in Sri Lanka but also presents critical insights into effective military strategies applicable to individual cases of insurgency.
The civil war in Sri Lanka, primarily involving the LTTE, was rooted in deep-seated ethnic tensions exacerbated by specific legal and political measures throughout the 20th century. The shrinking space for Tamil political activism triggered a violent response leading to a protracted conflict which lasted for nearly three decades. The war involved strategic military operations, peace negotiations, and international interventions, reflecting varied approaches to resolving intra-state conflicts.
The analysis of Sri Lanka’s civil conflict illustrates the transformative impact of recognized military strategies and the potential for achieving peace post-insurgency. The contrasts drawn with other insurgent conflicts underscore the unique circumstances under which the LTTE was defeated, thereby offering lessons that may be relevant for other nations confronting similar insurgency threats. The final resolution of the Sri Lankan conflict serves as evidence that enduring peace can follow decisive military action rather than mere negotiations.
Original Source: slguardian.org
